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BAD FAITH FEE-SHIFTING IN FEDERAL 
COURTS:  WHAT CONDUCT QUALIFIES? 
JACOB SINGER† 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the so-called “American rule” of attorney fees, each 
party pays its own attorney fees, regardless of the outcome of the 
proceeding.1  Federal courts, however, have always recognized 
numerous exceptions to the American rule, one of which is the 
“bad faith exception.”2  The exception allows courts to order fee-
shifting despite the American rule.  Specifically, when one of the 
parties to the action has acted in extreme bad faith, it must pay 
its opponent’s attorney fees.3  The exception promotes justice by 
making the prevailing party whole.4  Additionally, the exception 
enhances judicial efficiency by minimizing the number of 
frivolous claims on the courts’ dockets.5   
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.S., 2003, Lander College of Liberal Arts and 
Sciences. I thank Melissa C. King for her suggestions, insight, and patience 
throughout the process of writing this Note. I am also indebted to Kevin Baum and 
Christopher Linden for their constructive criticism throughout this process. Finally, 
I thank my wife Lisa and son Michael for their unconditional love and support.  
1 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 
(1973); Peter N. Cubita et al., Note, Awards of Attorney’s Fees in the Federal Courts, 
56 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 277, 278–79 (1982). The American rule contrasts with the so-
called “English rule,” which allows for attorney fees, which allows the prevailing 
party—subject to a few exceptions—to recover reasonable attorney fees from the 
losing party. See Joan Chipser, Note, Attorney’s Fees and the Federal Bad Faith 
Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 320 (1977). Although the substance of the rule was 
announced in the eighteenth century, the rule’s name was not coined until the 
beginning of the twentieth century. See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the 
American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 10–11, 27–
28 (1984). 
2 For a complete list of the exceptions to the American rule, see infra note 18. 
3 The bad faith exception is typically applied in this manner, but the Supreme 
Court has allowed for the possibility that a prevailing party that acts in bad faith 
can be responsible for its opponent’s fees. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 53. 
4 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 
(1967); see also infra note 29. 
5 See, e.g., Crum & Forster Ins. Co. v. Goodmark Indus., Inc., No. 05-CV-3633, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54757, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2008). This argument relies 
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Consider the following: A business owner intentionally 
started a fire—his fourth in twelve years—in his warehouse that 
was insured by an insurance company.  After the fire destroyed 
his warehouse, the business owner filed an insurance claim.  
Among other papers, he submitted a signed statement asserting 
that his actions or negligence did not cause the fire.  When an 
insurance adjuster arrived at the warehouse to assess the 
damage, the owner bribed the adjuster to overvalue the loss.  The 
insurance company paid out nearly $1 million on the fraudulent 
claim.   
In a criminal action, a federal court convicted the owner of 
thirty counts relating to the series of fires he had started at his 
warehouse.  The insurance company—realizing that its payout to 
the owner was based on fraud—demanded restitution from the 
owner.  The owner refused, and the insurance company filed a 
claim to recoup its payment.  The court awarded the insurance 
company nearly $2 million on summary judgment for the return 
of the actual payout, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, 
and costs.  In an effort to mitigate its litigation costs, the 
insurance company moved to request its attorney fees from the 
owner, arguing that the owner’s extreme bad faith actions 
necessitated the litigation.  This scenario played out in Crum & 
Forester Insurance Co., where the insurance company sued for 
restitution after discovering the fraud.  The fraud became 
apparent after the owner was convicted in federal court.6   
This scenario raised some important questions:  Can justice 
be served in such a situation absent fee-shifting?  Would fee-
shifting deter this wrongful conduct, thereby promoting a more 
constructive form of dispute resolution and a more manageable 
court docket?   
This Note explores how the federal circuits interpret the bad 
faith exception differently and recommends that the exception 
must apply to both prelitigation and litigation conduct to serve 
the policies of the American rule and the bad faith exception.  
 
on both parties acting with common sense and not continuing an action when it is 
clearly unwarranted. The argument, however, discounts the inexplicable reality that 
losing parties act with intentional bad faith, both before and during a litigation 
proceeding. See id.  
6 This situation is substantially similar to the facts of Crum & Forster Insurance 
Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54757, at *2–5, *7–10. 
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Part I sets out the history underpinning the American rule.  Part 
II sets forth the rule’s bad faith exception and the policies 
underlying the exception.  It then distinguishes the common-law 
bad faith exception from Rule 11 fee-shifting.  Part III introduces 
three Supreme Court cases that have established the parameters 
of the bad faith exception.  It then examines the varying ways in 
which the circuit courts have applied these cases and limited the 
bad faith exception to conduct occurring during certain time 
periods.  Part IV examines the reasons the courts have given for 
limiting the exception and refutes them.  It considers what the 
exception’s parameters should be based on the policies behind the 
American rule and its bad faith exception.  Finally, Part V 
proposes applying the bad faith exception to bad faith conduct 
both before and during litigation and discusses the ramifications 
of such a proposal. 
I. HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RULE 
Originally, the United States followed the English rule with 
respect to fee-shifting, which required the losing party to pay the 
prevailing party’s attorney fees.  This rule had roots stretching as 
far back as Roman law.”7  The English rule, however, never took 
root in American courts; in 1796, the Supreme Court rejected the 
English approach and created the American rule, which requires 
each party to pay its own attorney fees.8  The Court opined that 
the “general practice of the United States [was] in opposition to” 
the English rule.9  Moreover, the Court noted that “even if [the 
American rule is] not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to 
the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by 
statute.”10  
The Supreme Court has articulated two general public 
policies underlying the adoption of the American rule.  First, 
 
7 Buffy D. Lord, Dispute Resolution on the High Seas: Aspects of Maritime 
Arbitration, 8 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 71, 86 n.109 (2002) (“The tradition of awarding 
attorney’s fees and costs can be traced to Roman law in which the losing party was 
required to pay the prevailing party’s costs.”).   
8 Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796). 
9 Id.   
10 Id. The Supreme Court “has adhered to [the American rule] up to modern 
times. It has become a hard and fast rule of law and is as entrenched as any in the 
American judicial system.” Chipser, supra note 1.  
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 693 (2010) 
696 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:693   
 
parties should not be punished for merely bringing a suit.11  
Second, “litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable 
attorney’s fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial 
administration.”12   
In the late nineteenth century, after courts refused to make 
a common law exception to the American rule,13 hosts of federal 
and state statutes attempted to remedy the rule’s harshness by 
allowing fee-shifting in limited circumstances.  Many courts, 
however, found these fee-shifting statutes unconstitutional.14  
These courts and other proponents of the American rule argued 
that forcing a losing party to pay its opponent’s attorney fees is “a 
form of penalty and that a litigant should not be penalized for 
merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit.”15  The burgeoning 
anti-American rule movement, however, advocated that “under 
[the American rule,] the successful party is never fully 
compensated because such party must pay [its] counsel fees 
which may be as much or more than the total recovery in the 
suit.”16  The American rule needed to be modified to “mak[e] 
plaintiffs whole,” thereby ensuring justice in the court system.17  
Hence, the bad faith exception to the American rule was born.   
II. THE BAD FAITH EXCEPTION 
A. Generally 
The bad faith exception18 “awards attorney fees against 
parties who litigate in bad faith, for the obvious purpose of 
 
11 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 
(1967). 
12 Id. 
13 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 
26 (recognizing that courts did not make such an exception until the twentieth 
century). 
14 See Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 26. Courts regarded fee-shifting as something 
of a confiscatory act and avoided it unless the legislature unequivocally required it. 
See id. at 25. Some courts, therefore, allowed fee-shifting statutes only when the 
defendant had committed an illegal act. See id. 
15 Chipser, supra note 1, at 321. 
16 Id. 
17 SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL., COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 549 (1992); 
Chipser, supra note 1, at 321–22; see sources cited infra note 29. 
18 “There are six general categories of exceptions to the ‘American rule:’ 
(1) Contracts; (2) Bad Faith; (3) Common Fund; (4) Substantial Benefit; 
(5) Contempt; and (6) Fee-shifting statutes.” David A. Root, Note, Attorney Fee-
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deterring illegitimate behavior in the courtroom, and sometimes 
outside of it.”19  A bad faith attorney fee award “can be imposed 
only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice.”20  
The Supreme Court in Hall v. Cole21 adopted the bad faith 
exception and explained that “the underlying rationale of ‘fee 
shifting’ is, of course, punitive, and the essential element in 
triggering the award of fees is therefore the existence of ‘bad 
faith’ on the part of the unsuccessful litigant.”22  Moreover, the 
Court considered fee-shifting necessary to uphold the honor of 
the federal courts.  “[T]ampering with the administration of 
justice . . . is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect 
and safeguard the public . . . .”23  While American courts have 
generally adopted the bad faith exception, they have done so 
uneasily.24  Similarly, although courts and legislatures have 
carved out various exceptions to the American rule, they have 
shown no desire to dispose of the rule altogether.25   
The policies supporting the American rule do not apply to a 
party that acts with extreme bad faith.  The Supreme Court has 
articulated the policies underlying the American rule: 
(1) encouraging parties to “vindicate their rights”26 and 
(2) relieving the judiciary from dedicating resources to determine 
“what constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees.”27  These policies do 
 
Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” 
and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 585 (2005). Of the six, the 
bad faith exception is the most ambiguous. Id. at 586 & n.28. “In the absence of one 
of these equitable exceptions, however, the rule has been consistently followed for 
almost 200 years.” Summit Valley Indus. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 
456 U.S. 717, 721 (1982) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 
U.S. 240, 249–50 (1975)). 
19 Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 29. 
20 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1979) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); cf. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 
(1979) (denying punitive damages); Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Horizon Air 
Indus., Inc., 976 F.2d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing a policy of denying punitive 
damages as its rationale for denying the prevailing party its attorney fees).   
21 412 U.S. 1 (1973). 
22 Id. at 5. 
23 Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944), 
overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976). 
24 Even today it exists only in the federal system and in some states, mostly by 
statute. See Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 29. 
25 See id. 
26 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). 
27 Id. 
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not apply to a bad faith party, which, by definition, is not merely 
vindicating its rights.28  Moreover, important public policies 
argue in favor of a bad faith exception.  Such policies involve 
“punishment of the losing party, indemnification of the prevailing 
party, and . . . deterrence of frivolous and bad faith litigation.”29  
These policies apply to a bad faith party whose actions 
necessarily requires deterrence and deserve punishment.  Bad 
faith parties, therefore, deserve to be punished by paying their 
opponent’s attorney fees.   
B. Rule 11 Is Not Enough 
The bad faith exception to the American rule does not 
supersede Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure30 
(“Rule 11”) because the bad faith exception’s reach is broader 
than Rule 11.31  Under Rule 11, by presenting a pleading to the 
 
In support of the American rule, it has been argued that since litigation is 
at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or 
prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged 
from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing 
included the fees of their opponents’ counsel. Also, the time, expense, and 
difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes 
reasonable attorney’s fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial 
administration. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
28 For an explanation of why the judicial administration policy—or even the 
deterrence policy—does not apply to a bad faith party, see infra Part IV.B. Notably, 
the primary policy supporting the American rule is the need to encourage parties to 
vindicate their rights. See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718. 
29 Lord, supra note 7, at 86; see HALPERN ET AL., supra note 17 (finding that the 
rationale for awarding attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs is to “deter[ ] 
infringement, encourag[e] colorable claims, and mak[e] plaintiffs whole”); John 
Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees in International Commercial 
Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (1999); K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright 
Infringement and the Presumption of Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of 
the Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 173, 205 (1999); 
Cubita et al., supra note 1, at 282 n.16. 
30 A discussion of Rule 11’s applicability is necessary because when there is bad-
faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under 
the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the inherent 
power. But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statue nor the Rules 
are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power—that is, the bad 
faith exception. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). 
31 Conversely, Rule 11 is broader than the bad faith exception as it can force the 
“outright dismissal” of the suit and other sanctions, while the bad faith exception’s 
only sanction is attorney fees—but that is beyond the scope of this Note. Chambers, 
501 U.S. at 45; see FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). A Rule 11 sanction is limited to what 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 693 (2010) 
2010] BAD FAITH FEE-SHIFTING 699 
 
court, an attorney represents—amongst other things—that the 
litigation “is not being presented for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the 
cost of litigation.”32  Should a party bring litigation for an 
“improper purpose,”33 Rule 11 gives courts the authority to 
impose sanctions on that party.  “[S]anction[s] may include 
nonmonetary directives[,] an order to pay a penalty into court[,] 
or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, 
an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the 
reasonable attorney’s fees . . . directly resulting from the 
violation.”34   
Rule 11 is narrower than the bad faith exception in two 
important ways.  First, the Rule’s sanction power does not have 
jurisdiction over acts that degrade the judicial system, such as 
attempts to “deprive [a] [c]ourt of jurisdiction by acts of fraud” 
that are “performed outside the confines of [the] court.”35  Second, 
Rule 11 only applies to the presentation of “pleading[s], written 
motion[s], or other paper[s]” to the court.36  The bad faith 
exception, on the other hand, “reach[es] more litigation abuses”37 
and applies to all conduct during litigation and perhaps even 
conduct that precedes the litigation.38  Therefore, the bad faith 
 
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4).   
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).   
33 Id.   
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (emphasis added).   
35 NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu TV & Radio, 124 F.R.D. 120, 138 (W.D. La. 1989), 
aff’d, 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990), aff’d, sub nom., Chambers, 501 U.S. 32. 
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b); In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 97 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (holding that the purpose of this Rule 11 requirement is to “streamline 
litigation”). There is a third distinction. Courts may order Rule 11 sanctions sua 
sponte. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3) (“On the Court’s Initiative. On its own, the court may 
order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why conduct specifically 
described in the order has not violated Rule 11(b).”). On the other hand, courts 
cannot order common law bad faith fee-shifting absent a motion by one of the 
parties. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49–50. This distinction, however, is not germane 
to a discussion of the bad faith exception’s timeline. Moreover, whether fee-shifting 
can be ordered by the court sua sponte is usually irrelevant because parties are, if 
anything, overeager to request fee-shifting.   
37 Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 352 (8th Cir. 2003). 
38 This Note analyzes what timeline is subject to the bad faith exception. See 
infra Part III. 
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exception acts as a catch-all for bad faith conduct that is not 
subject to Rule 11.39   
C. Bad Faith Timeline 
Although federal courts universally accept the existence of 
the bad faith exception, no such consensus exists regarding what 
constitutes the requisite bad faith conduct necessary to trigger 
the exception.40  There are three distinct time periods in which 
bad faith can occur and possibly warrant the bad faith 
exception.41  Bad faith conduct can occur during the litigation, 
when a party obstinately refuses to recognize his opponent’s clear 
legal right, or during the conduct that is the basis of the cause of 
action.42  All federal courts agree that bad faith conduct during 
the litigation itself warrants the bad faith exception.43  Litigation 
bad faith conduct includes frivolous motions, noncompliance with 
court orders, an unreasonable refusal to investigate claims or 
take part in mediation,44 and any other conduct intended to 
harass a party to the litigation.45  Conversely, courts are divided 
 
39 See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43. 
40 In other words, there is no consensus regarding which conduct is subject to 
the bad faith exception and its fee-shifting penalty. 
41 Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226, 1230 
(6th Cir. 1984). This is subject to the individual court’s interpretation of the bad 
faith exception’s timeline. 
42 Id. 
43 Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 622 F. Supp. 232, 238 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (“It 
appears universally accepted that bad faith in the conduct of the litigation itself may 
warrant imposition of fees, as may the bad faith maintenance of a meritless claim or 
defense.” (emphasis added)); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Pub. Co., 240 
F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 41 F. App’x 507 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“[B]ad faith in the conduct of the litigation is a valid ground for an award of 
[attorney] fees.”); Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1230 (“Although the bad faith exception is 
firmly established in Supreme Court precedent, its limits are not precisely 
defined.”). 
44 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 (assessing attorney fees for not complying with a 
court order); Peoples Mortgage Corp. v. Kan. Bankers Sur. Co., 62 F. App’x 232, 239 
(10th Cir. 2003) (finding attorney fees against a party who did not investigate the 
claim and refused mediation); Interstate Cigar Co. v. Sterling Drug Inc., 655 F.2d 
29, 32 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming attorney fees for a frivolous motion). Although 
Peoples Mortgage Corp. discuses an attorney fee award under state law, it is still an 
example of bad faith conduct during litigation and is applicable to the federal courts 
as well. 62 F. App’x at 239.  
45 See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 n.10. 
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as to whether the bad faith exception applies to the two 
prelitigation time periods.46 
There are two prelitigation time periods that may give rise to 
the bad faith exception.  The first is the time period in which the 
conduct underpinning the cause of action occurred.47  This 
conduct encompasses most intentional acts committed by the bad 
faith party, including embezzlement, battery, and fraud.48  When 
such conduct is carried out with extreme bad faith, some courts 
have found it sufficient to warrant the bad faith exception to the 
American rule.49   The second prelitigation time period begins 
when the injured party attempts to assert its legal right and ends 
upon the commencement of the litigation.50  Some circuits hold 
that bad faith conduct by a party during this period—that is, 
refusing to recognize its opponent’s clear legal right—warrants 
the bad faith exception.51  They consider such conduct sufficient 
to allow for fee-shifting because the “action should have been 
unnecessary and was compelled by the [party’s] unreasonable, 
obdurate obstinacy.”52   
 
46 Peterson, 622 F. Supp. at 238 (“On the other hand, some courts will award 
attorney’s fees for bad faith in that conduct which gave rise to the litigation 
itself . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
47 Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982).   
48 This was the case in the scenario described above. See supra text 
accompanying notes 5–6; see also Schlein v. Smith, 160 F.2d 22, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1947). 
49 See id. 
50 Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Horizon Air Indus., Inc., 976 F.2d 541, 550 
(9th Cir. 1992); Stolberg v. Bd. of Trs., 474 F.2d 485, 491 (2d Cir. 1973). 
51 See Schlein, 160 F.2d at 45. This Note will refer to this type of conduct as the 
“middle” timeline. 
52 Stolberg, 474 F.2d at 490 (quoting Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 345 F.2d 310 (4th 
Cir.1965)); see also infra Part III.C. Of course a party’s conduct can only be 
characterized as bad faith if there is no genuine dispute and the party still refuses to 
recognize it adversary’s legal right. See Tenants & Owners in Opp’n to Redev. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of HUD, 406 F. Supp. 960, 964 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (“Vigorous advocacy involves 
conflict and is a natural and expected by-product of litigation in our judicial system. 
It is only conduct that clearly goes beyond generally accepted vigor and persistence 
commonly employed in our adversary system that may be considered in determining 
whether sanctions should be imposed.” (emphasis added)). Said another way:  
Applying the bad faith exception when there is a genuine dispute would not 
be consonant with the right in a free society to use the legal process nor 
with the main purpose of courts—to settle disputes. For example, if there is 
a genuine controversy as to the facts or the law, mere refusal to settle 
should never be considered obstinancy. There must be more. 
Chipser, supra note 1, at 330.  Moreover, the actual award is limited to the costs 
directly related to the bad faith party’s obstinacy. See Lipsig v. Nat’l Student Mktg. 
Corp., 633 F.2d 178, 181 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Obstinacy awards must be limited, 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 693 (2010) 
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III. THE BAD FAITH EXCEPTION ACCORDING TO THE COURTS 
A. The Leading Supreme Court Cases 
The Supreme Court first ruled on which time period qualifies 
for the bad faith exception in 1962.  In Vaughan v. Atkinson, the 
Court awarded attorney fees in a suit brought by a seaman for 
his employer’s failure to respond to a claim for maintenance and 
cure.53  First, the Court laid down the principle that an attorney 
fee award is “ ‘part of the historic equity jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.’ ”54  Using this principle, the Court found that the 
employer callously refused to make any investigation into the 
seaman’s claim, and “[a]s a result of that recalcitrance, [the 
seaman] was forced to hire a lawyer and go to court to get what 
was plainly owed him under laws that are centuries old.”55  
Finding the employer’s behavior to be “willful and persistent,” 
the Court awarded the seaman his attorney fees.56  The Court 
classified its fifty percent contingency attorney fee award as 
“damages suffered for [the employer’s] failure to pay 
maintenance”57 and therefore, a “necessary expense[ ].”58 
While Vaughan’s facts fell within the middle timeline—when 
a party obstinately denies his opponent’s clear legal right prior to 
 
however, to payment for work and expense attributable to bad-faith endeavors.”) 
(citing Browning Debenture Holders’ Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1089 (2d 
Cir. 1977)); see also Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975).   
53 369 U.S. 527, 529–30 (1962).   
54 Id. at 530 (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939)). 
For more information on the courts equitable powers, see: Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 
4–5 (1973); Sprague, 307 U.S. at 164–65 & n.2; Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U.S. 451, 457 
(1892); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 535–36 (1881); Alexander B. Rotbart, 
Comment, Sanctions and the Inherent Power: The Supreme Court Expands the 
American Rule’s Bad Faith Exception for Fee Shifting—Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 
16 NOVA L. REV. 1527, 1540–41 (1992). The equity jurisdiction of the federal courts 
originated in the English Court of Chancery, which was empowered to allocate “the 
entire expenses of the litigation of one of the parties as fair justice to the other party 
will permit . . . .” Sprague, 307 U.S. at 164–65 & n.1. See generally 1 J. STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA §§ 57–58 (14th ed. 1918).   
55 Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 530–31. 
56 Id. at 531. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 530 (quoting Cortes v. Balt. Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 
(1932)). Despite Vaughan classifying its attorney fee award as “damages,” eleven 
years later the Supreme Court reclassified the award as bad faith attorney fees. See 
Hall, 412 U.S. at 2, 4. 
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the start of litigation—the Court did not make any distinctions 
between the two prelitigation time periods in later cases as they 
relate to the bad faith exception.59  Instead, the Court “recognized 
that attorneys’ fees may be awarded to a successful party when 
his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons.”60 
A decade later, in Hall v. Cole,61 the Supreme Court set forth 
the parameters for the bad faith exception’s timeline.  There, the 
Court affirmed an attorney fee award for an expelled union 
member who regained his union membership in a suit brought 
under a federal statute,62 by noting “that ‘bad faith’ may be 
found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in 
the conduct of the litigation.”63   
More recently, the Court reexamined the bad faith exception 
in greater detail.  In Chambers v. NASCO Inc.,64 Chambers—a 
sole shareholder and director of a radio and television station—
contracted to sell his station and license to the NASCO 
corporation.65  When Chambers instead sold the station to a third 
party, NASCO sued for breach of contract.66  During the 
litigation, Chambers attempted to sell his properties to a third 
party so that “the District Court would lack jurisdiction over the 
properties.”67  Moreover, Chambers “intentionally withheld [this] 
information from the court.”68  Despite being warned by the 
district court, Chambers “refused to allow NASCO to inspect [its] 
 
59 F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129–30 (1974). The two time 
periods of prelitigation conduct are: (1) the conduct underlying the claim itself and 
(2) the middle timeline, when a party obstinately refuses to recognize its opponent’s 
clear legal right. See supra text accompanying notes 47–50; see also Skehan v. Bd. of 
Trs. of Bloomsburg State Coll., 538 F.2d 53, 57 (3d Cir. 1976) (“[T]here is 
a[n] . . . exception to the American rule, which allows the recovery of fees as an 
element of damages for prelitigation vexation or oppression in resisting a just 
claim.”). 
60 F.D. Rich Co., 417 U.S. at 129. 
61 412 U.S. 1 (1973). 
62 Id. at 2, 4.  
63 Id. at 15.  
64 501 U.S. 32 (1991). 
65 Id. at 35–36. 
66 Id. at 36. 
67 Id. at 36–37. 
68 Id. at 37. Chambers did more than neglect to mention the attempted sale; the 
court explicitly questioned him about it. See id. 
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corporate records.”69  “Chambers [then] proceeded with ‘a series 
of meritless motions and pleadings and delaying actions.’ ”70   
When the district court entered judgment in favor of 
NASCO, Chambers appealed.71  The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit “found the appeal frivolous” and therefore, imposed 
sanctions “and remanded the case to the district court with 
orders to fix the amount of appellate sanctions and to determine 
whether further sanctions should be imposed for the manner in 
which the litigation had been conducted.”72  The district court 
found that additional “sanctions were appropriate ‘for the 
manner in which this proceeding was conducted in the district 
court.’ ”73  Therefore, the “[district] court imposed sanctions . . . in 
the form of attorney’s fees and expenses totaling $996,644.65” for 
the way Chambers conducted in both the district and appellate 
court proceedings.74 
 
69 Id. at 38. 
70 Id. (quoting NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu TV & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 138 
(W.D. La. 1989)), aff’d, 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990), aff’d, sub nom., Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991)). 
71 Id. at 39–40. 
72 Id. at 40. 
73 Id. (quoting Calcasieu TV & Radio, 124 F.R.D. at 123). 
74 Id. This amount “represented the entire amount of NASCO’s litigation costs 
paid to its attorneys.” Id. The district court examined several approaches to 
determine if sanctions were also appropriate for Chambers’s conduct in the district 
court. The court “first considered Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. It noted that 
the alleged sanctionable conduct was that Chambers and the other defendants 
had . . . ‘filed false and frivolous pleadings.’ ” Id. at 41 (quoting Calcasieu TV & 
Radio, 124 F.R.D. at 138). The court, however, found that the “falsity of the 
pleadings at issue did not become apparent until after the trial on the merits, so that 
it would have been impossible to assess sanctions at the time the papers were filed. 
Consequently, the District Court deemed Rule 11 ‘insufficient’ for its purposes.” Id. 
(quoting Calcasieu TV & Radio, 124 F.R.D. at 139). The district court also “declined 
to impose sanctions under § 1927, both because the statute applies only to attorneys, 
and therefore would not reach Chambers, and because the statute was [also] not 
broad enough to reach ‘acts which degrade the judicial system.’ ” Id. at 41–42 
(quoting Calcasieu TV & Radio, 124 F.R.D. at 139); see 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006) 
(“Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, 
expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”). 
Instead, the court used its “inherent power in imposing sanctions, stressing that ‘the 
wielding of that inherent power is particularly appropriate when the offending 
parties have practiced a fraud upon the court.’ ” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 42 (quoting 
Calcasieu TV & Radio, 124 F.R.D. at 139). The court’s authority to impose fee-
shifting comes from its inherent power. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
This power is the source for the court’s authority to apply the bad faith exception 
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The Supreme Court, in validating the attorney fee award, 
discussed the little-known equity power that federal courts 
possess.  “Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be 
exercised with restraint and discretion.  A primary aspect of that 
discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for 
conduct which abuses the judicial process.”75  The Court held that 
“outright dismissal of a lawsuit . . . is a particularly severe 
sanction, yet is within the court’s discretion.  Consequently, the 
‘less severe sanction’ of an assessment of attorney’s fees is 
undoubtedly within a court’s inherent power as well.”76  
Rounding out its equity power discussion, the Court explained 
that “ ‘[t]he award of attorney’s fees for bad faith serves the same 
purpose as a remedial fine imposed for civil contempt,’ because ‘it 
vindicates the District Court’s authority over a recalcitrant 
litigant.’ ”77   
Finally, “[b]ased on the circumstances of this case,” the 
Court found “that the District Court acted within its discretion in 
assessing as a sanction for Chambers’ bad faith conduct the 
entire amount of NASCO’s attorney’s fees.”78  The Court also 
noted that it “express[ed] no opinion as to whether the District 
Court would have had the inherent power to sanction Chambers 
for conduct relating to the underlying breach of contract.”79 
B. Some Early Circuit Court Cases Have Implied That the Bad 
Faith Exception Applies to All Prelitigation Conduct 
Older cases coming out of two circuits seem to extend the bad 
faith exception to all conduct, even the conduct that gave rise to 
the substantive claims.  In 1947, in Schlein v. Smith,80 the D.C. 
Circuit affirmed fee-shifting on account of the losing party’s 
criminal and oppressive conduct that preceded the litigation.81  
 
and therefore, to impose attorney fee-shifting on certain losing parties. See Hall v. 
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1973). 
75 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45 (citation omitted). 
76 Id. at 45 (citation omitted) (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 
752, 765 (1980)). 
77 Id. at 53 (Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978)). 
78 Id. at 55. 
79 Id. at 55 n.16. 
80 160 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947). 
81 Id. at 25. “[I]t is an almost universally recognized rule that [attorney fees] 
may be recovered in cases . . . where the wrongful action complained of is 
characterized by some such circumstances of aggravation as willfulness, 
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Four years later, in Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,82 the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed an attorney fee award for individuals 
who were oppressed by their union before the litigation started.83   
These cases, however, are not persuasive in determining the 
contemporary bad faith exception timeline for several reasons.  
First, both cases are over a half-century old84 and neither circuit 
has come out with similar holdings recently.85  Second, whether 
these cases actually extend the bad faith exception to all 
prelitigation conduct is disputed.86  Third, both of these cases 
predate the three Supreme Court cases that set forth the 
elements of the bad faith exception.87   
C. The Supreme Court Cases Have Been Interpreted Differently 
by the Circuits  
The Sixth Circuit held that the bad faith exception is 
inapplicable to conduct that gives rise to the claim.88  In 
Shimman v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 
18, a “[d]issident” union member was assaulted at a union 
meeting.89  In evaluating the union member’s request for 
 
wantonness, malice, oppression, brutality, insult, recklessness, gross negligence, or 
gross fraud on the part of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Ballard v. Spruill, 74 F.2d 
464, 466 (1934)).  
82 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951). 
83 Id. at 481. “The Court noted that the defendant union was a powerful 
organization as contrasted with the insular impotency of the plaintiff members.” 
Chipser, supra note 1, at 327. 
84 Rolax, 186 F.2d 473 (decided in 1951); Schlein, 160 F.2d 22 (decided in 1947). 
85 It is unclear, however, whether these circuits had the opportunity to apply the 
bad faith exception to conduct giving rise to the action. 
86 Compare Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 18, 744 F.2d 
1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that Schlein does not apply “to an attorney fee 
award arising from a federal statutory claim for which punitive damages are 
inappropriate”), and id. (finding the common benefit exception as the basis for 
Rolax’s attorney fee award), with Schlein, 160 F.2d at 25 (holding that “it was proper 
to award counsel fees” for the prelitigation fraud by a mortgagor), and Straub v. 
Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 600 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that the fee award in 
Rolax was for “activity which formed the basis for the suit”). 
87 These cases are Vaughan, Hall, and Chambers. See supra Part III.A. The 
earliest of these cases, Vaughan, was not decided until 1962. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 
369 U.S. 527 (1962). 
88 744 F.2d 1226, 1233 (6th Cir. 1984). 
89 An earlier appeal discusses the facts in greater detail. See Shimman v. Frank, 
625 F.2d 80, 85 (6th Cir. 1980), rev’d sub nom., Shimman, 744 F.2d 1226. 
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attorney fees under the bad faith exception, the Sixth Circuit 
found that that  
[t]he bad faith considered by courts construing this exception 
generally falls within one of three categories: (1) bad faith 
occurring during the course of the litigation; (2) bad faith in 
bringing an action or in causing an action to be brought; and 
(3) bad faith in the acts giving rise to the substantive claim.90   
The court then delineated which prelitigation time period is 
subject to the bad faith exception:  “Care must be taken to 
distinguish a defendant’s bad faith in necessitating that an 
action be filed or in maintaining a defense from a defendant’s bad 
faith in the acts giving rise to the claim.”91   
The Shimman Court held that the bad faith exception should 
not extend to conduct giving rise to the action and was not 
persuaded by the Supreme Court’s dicta in Hall v. Cole.92  
Although Hall’s language supports extending the bad faith 
exception to the acts giving rise to the claim, the Shimman Court 
found such an interpretation unpersuasive for several reasons.93  
First, the court pointed out that Hall’s language was merely 
dictum, and therefore, not binding.94  Second, the court disputed 
this broad interpretation of Hall’s language.95  Hall quoted 
Moore’s Federal Practice as evidence that the bad faith exception 
applies only to litigation conduct.96  This quoted passage, the 
Shimman Court noted, is preceded by the following phrase: 
“where an unfounded action or defense is brought or 
maintained.”97  The court found this phrase to be evidence that 
the exception, as interpreted by Moore’s, only applies to conduct 
 
90 Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1230. 
91 Id. 
92 412 U.S. 1 (1973); see Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1232. 
93 The Shimman Court actually mentioned four reasons for its holding, but only 
two of them have general application. See Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1232–34. 
94 See id. at 1232. 
95 Id. at 1232–33. “It is clear, however, that ‘bad faith’ may be found, not only in 
the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.” Hall, 
412 U.S. at 15. 
96 Hall, 412 U.S. at 5 (“[F]ederal court[s] may award counsel fees to a successful 
party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons.” (quoting 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE 1709 (2d ed. 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
97 Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1233 (quoting 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1709 (2d ed. 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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during the litigation.98  Therefore, the Shimman Court concluded, 
it “is clear that Hall did not extend the bad faith exception” to 
the acts giving rise to the claim.99   
Finally, the Shimman Court held that applying the bad faith 
exception to the acts giving rise to the claim defeats the rationale 
of the general rule that parties bear their own fees.100  “[T]he 
American rule protects the right to go to court and litigate a non-
frivolous claim or defense.  The unsuccessful litigant is not 
penalized even when an injured party whose claim is upheld is 
not made completely whole because of the cost of litigation.”101   
Other federal courts have similarly applied the bad faith 
exception to conduct falling within the middle timeframe—bad 
faith in bringing an action or causing an action to be brought.  
Unlike the Shimman Court, however, these courts have not 
ignored the language in Hall that discussed the exception’s 
timeline.102  For example, in Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. 
Horizon Air Industries,103 a “union filed suit against Horizon 
under the Railway Labor Act . . . , alleging [that] Horizon had 
violated its duty . . . to ‘exert every reasonable effort’ to reach 
agreement with the union.”104  The district court sided with the 
union and required Horizon to “cease and desist from engaging in 
any conduct that [was] designed to forestall an agreement.”105  
The court found the union was entitled to attorney fees in the 
amount of $250,713.50.106   
 
98 Id. at 1233 n.10. 
99 Id. The Shimman Court, therefore, held that the bad faith exception only 
applies to conduct during litigation and the middle timeline, but not to the conduct 
that gave rise to the claim. See id. at 1232. The court actually classified these first 
two reasons as one, see id.; however, this Note uses a more delineated classification.   
100 See id. at 1231. 
101 Id. The court went onto to explain the reasoning and policy behind the bad 
faith exception: “The unsuccessful litigant may be penalized, however, if the 
litigation was not maintained in good faith. In such a case, the successful party has 
ordinarily suffered two wrongs: one in the events giving rise to the litigation, and 
another in the wrongful conduct or instigation of the litigation.” Id.  
102 A literal reading of “ ‘bad faith’ may be found, not only in the actions that led 
to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation” calls for extending the bad 
faith exception to prelitigation conduct. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). 
103 976 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1992). 
104 Id. at 543 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2006)). 
105 Id. (quoting Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Horizon Air Indus., No. 89-465, 
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12621, at *21 (D. Or. Aug. 13, 1990)). 
106 Id. 
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Upon review, the Ninth Circuit overturned the attorney fees 
award.107  The court’s holding focused on policy.108  The court 
declined to apply the bad faith exception to prelitigation conduct 
to avoid “conflict with the rationale of the American rule.”109  
Instead, it interpreted Hall’s language as not extending the bad 
faith exception to all prelitigation bad faith conduct.110  
Ultimately, the court limited Hall’s timeline language to 
prelitigation conduct when the losing party obstinately denied 
his opponent its clear legal right.111  The court held that Hall did 
not intend to subject such conduct to the bad faith exception.112   
The Second Circuit, in multiple cases, has also held that a 
party’s denial of its opponent’s clear legal right warrants the bad 
faith exception.  In Stolberg v. Members of the Board of 
Trustees,113 a pre-Hall v. Cole decision, the Second Circuit held 
that a college professor who was wrongly denied tenure by 
university officials was entitled to fee-shifting because: (1) his 
“constitutional rights . . . were clear”; (2) “the long course of 
vindication of those rights . . . should . . . have been unnecessary”; 
and (3) awarding fees would help foster the “future exercise of 
 
107 See id. at 552. 
108 See id. at 549–51. 
109 Id. at 550. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. The court used a limited bad faith exception despite the numerous 
contradictory implications from previous Ninth Circuit holdings. See Dollar Sys., 
Inc. v. Avcar Leasing Sys., Inc., 890 F.2d 165, 176 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding an 
attorney award because the losing party acted in “bad faith in its conduct both prior 
to and during the course of the litigation”); McQuiston v. Marsh, 707 F.2d 1082, 1086 
(9th Cir. 1983) (remanding the case to the district court to adjudicate the “factual 
dispute as to the bad faith, if any, of the government both before and during the 
course of this litigation”); Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (applying the bad faith exception because the defendant “pursued the 
action after it discovered [one of its employees had lied], particularly by bringing 
needless, almost frivolous motions” (emphasis added)). The court in Flight 
Attendants noted these prior cases and made efforts to reconcile them with its 
holding. See 976 F.2d at 549 nn.10–11. Significantly, the Flight Attendants Court did 
not address other Ninth Circuit cases that have held prelitigation bad faith conduct 
warrants the bad faith exception. See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts 
Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1026 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding the “district court appropriately 
awarded attorney fees” to prevailing plaintiff where defendants’ “violation of 
[plaintiff’s] trademark rights and copyrights and [defendants’] conspiracy to pass off 
an imitation product constituted extraordinary, malicious, wanton, and oppressive 
conduct” which, in turn, gave rise to litigation in question). 
112 See Flight Attendants, 976 F.2d at 549–50. 
113 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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such rights at public institutions by other public employees.”114  
The court emphasized that the professor’s employment contract 
was not renewed “for reasons that were found to be 
constitutionally improper and which have never been seriously 
contested by [the university].”115  The Second Circuit interprets 
the bad faith exception to apply to a situation where litigation 
was “unnecessary” and only occurred due to the losing party’s 
“obstinacy.”116   
A year later, in Class v. Norton,117 decided shortly after Hall 
v. Cole, the Second Circuit again held that the middle timeline 
warrants the bad faith exception.118  Addressing Hall’s impact on 
its reasoning, the court stated: “Moreover, insofar as this 
standard for awarding costs and attorneys’ fees has been 
assimilated to bad faith, the evidence marshaled by the court 
sufficiently supports such a finding.”119   
 
114 Id. at 490–91. 
115 Id. at 490 (emphasis added). 
116 See id. (“[T]he standard is whether ‘bringing of the action should have been 
unnecessary and was compelled by the school board’s unreasonable, obdurate 
obstinacy . . . .’ Because suit clearly should have been unnecessary in this case and 
was compelled by defendants’ conduct, counsel fees should have been awarded.” 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 321 
(4th Cir. 1965)). The court did not explicitly say that prelitigation bad faith conduct 
is insufficient to warrant an attorney fees award. Nevertheless, the court’s entire 
thrust is on the losing party’s obstinacy, and it refers to this conduct as “the 
standard,” which implies that the conduct must occur during the time period—or the 
litigation itself—for fee-shifting to be appropriate. See id. If the court interpreted the 
bad faith exception differently, the original bad faith act that was the cause of the 
claim—the improper denial of tenure for the professor—should be acknowledged in 
the court’s decision to award attorney fees.   
117 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974). 
118 Id. at 127. 
119 Id. (citations omitted). This statement was immediately preceded by the 
court’s declaration of the obstinacy test. Id. (“[T]he award of costs and attorneys’ 
fees . . . is warranted where bringing of the action should have been unnecessary and 
was compelled by . . . unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
More recently, Second Circuit district courts reiterated that the bad faith exception 
is applicable to the middle timeline.  
It is obvious that bad faith conduct by a party prior to litigation may be 
part of a pattern of misconduct which carries forward into the litigation. 
However, it is the law that a party’s bad faith, either prior to or during the 
litigation, may be the basis for an award of attorneys’ fees under the 
common law rule. 
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 590 F. Supp. 1509, 1514 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(emphasis added)); see N.Y. State Teamsters Conference Pension & Ret. Fund v. 
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D. Circuits That Only Apply the Bad Faith Exception to 
Litigation Conduct 
Three circuits have limited the bad faith exception to only 
apply to conduct during the litigation.120  The Eighth Circuit, 
relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers, 
held that the bad faith exception only applies to conduct during 
litigation.121  In Lamb Engineering & Construction Co. v. 
Nebraska Public Power District,122 Nebraska Public Power 
District (“NPPD”) contracted with Lamb to upgrade its sixty-five 
mile transmission line.123  A problem arose in that “immediately 
after NPPD awarded Lamb the contract, NPPD increased its 
original estimate of work to be performed by 80%, but refused to 
extend Lamb’s time for performance.”124  NPPD’s refusal 
increased Lamb’s costs.125  After inclement weather hindered 
Lamb’s progress, NPPD invoked the contract’s termination 
clause.126  When NPPD refused to pay Lamb’s termination costs, 
Lamb filed suit alleging that NPPD was responsible for its 
“reasonable and proper charges for termination.”127  “After a jury 
awarded Lamb damages,” the district court granted Lamb an 
attorney fee award on account of NPPD’s bad faith.128   
 
Hoh, 561 F. Supp. 687, 688–689 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that defendants were 
entitled to attorney fees since “plaintiff had not provided a scintilla of evidence to 
support its claimed violation of [the statute] and that its other arguments under that 
statute were wholly without merit. . . . It [was] clear . . . that [plaintiff had] brought 
this action in bad faith . . . .”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
At least one of these courts relied on Hall’s dictum in determining the timeline for 
the exception. See Sierra Club, 590 F. Supp. at 1514. 
120 While this section counts the Second Circuit as a circuit that only applies the 
bad faith exception to litigation conduct, there are Second Circuit courts that 
interpret the exception more broadly. See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying 
text. 
121 Lamb Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 103 F.3d 1422, 1436–37 
(8th Cir. 1997). 
122 103 F.3d 1422. 
123 Id. at 1427. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 1427–28. 
126 Id. at 1428–29. 
127 Id. at 1429. Only two of Lamb’s original three causes of action survived 
summary judgment, and the parties voluntarily dismissed one of the two surviving 
claims before trial. See id. 
128 Id. at 1430. The bad faith was either based on the jury’s affirmative response 
to an interrogatory given to the jury by the court to “determine whether NPPD acted 
in bad faith in administering the contract . . . or alternatively, [based] on the district 
court’s own finding of bad faith.” Id. 
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The Eighth Circuit reversed the attorney fee award because 
it held that the bad faith exception applied to litigation conduct 
only.129  This limited interpretation of the exception’s timeline 
was based on the recent Supreme Court decision in Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc.130  In Chambers, the Supreme Court approved the 
district court’s grant of attorney fees as “impos[ing] sanctions for 
the fraud [the defendant] perpetrated on the court and the bad 
faith he displayed toward both his adversary and the court 
throughout the course of the litigation.”131  The Eighth Circuit 
interpreted Chambers as rejecting the imposition of sanctions for 
the defendant’s breach of contract.132   
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit’s bad faith exception allows 
attorney fee awards only for litigation conduct.  In Morganroth & 
Morganroth v. DeLorean,133 the plaintiff was granted partial 
summary judgment for a diversity suit to set aside a fraudulent 
property transfer and was also awarded attorney fees on account 
of the defendant’s bad faith.134  The Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit overturned the district court’s discretionary 
decision to grant attorney fees.135  “[T]he district judge expressly 
stated that the award of attorney’s fees was not based on the 
conduct of the litigation.  Instead, the district court made it very 
clear that the award was based on the underlying previous 
conduct which gave rise to the cause of action . . . .”136  Instead, 
 
129 Id. at 1437. 
130 501 U.S. 32 (1991).  
131 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 54. 
132 See Lamb, 103 F.3d at 1437. Other Eighth Circuit courts have similarly 
applied this version of the bad faith exception. See, e.g., Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 
344, 352 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The power to award fees is exercisable only with respect to 
conduct occurring during the litigation, not conduct that gave rise to the cause of 
action.”); First Nat’l Bank v. Dunham, 471 F.2d 712, 713 (8th Cir. 1973); see also Red 
Sch. House, Inc. v. Office of Econ. Opportunity, 386 F. Supp. 1177, 1194 (D. Minn. 
1974); Chipser, supra note 1, at 329. 
133 213 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2000). 
134 Id. at 1305, 1317. The plaintiff’s claim was under title 28, chapter 6, section 6 
of the Utah Code, which “deems a transfer fraudulent without requiring proof of 
actual intent to defraud” for certain questionable transfers. Id. at 1305. 
135 Id. at 1317–18. “Although generally we review a district court’s award of 
attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion, we review its application of the legal 
principles underlying the award de novo.” Id. at 1317.  
136 Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Rogler v. Standard Ins. Co., 30 F. App’x 909, 
914 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[F]ederal district court has the inherent power to ‘assess 
attorney’s fees when a party has acted in bad faith . . . .’ ”) (quoting Chambers, 501 
U.S. at 45); id. (“However, this power only extends to ‘bad faith conduct in 
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the circuit court held that the bad faith exception is limited to 
litigation conduct.  Such a holding, it believed, reflected a “clear 
majority” of federal courts.137  In addition, it emphasized that “[a] 
defendant found liable for fraud, for instance, would 
automatically be guilty of bad faith with respect to the 
underlying cause of action, thus, abrogating the American Rule 
in all successful fraud actions.  Such complete abrogation is not 
the purpose of the bad faith exception.”138  This court surprisingly 
makes no mention of Hall v. Cole.139   
Lastly, a Second Circuit case, Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. 
Rascator Maritime S.A.,140 expressly limited the bad faith 
exception to litigation conduct.141  “The appropriate focus for the 
court in applying the bad-faith exception to the American rule is 
the conduct of the party in instigating or maintaining the 
litigation, for an assessment of whether there has been 
substantive bad faith . . . or procedural bad faith . . . .”142 
 
litigation.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Morganroth, 213 F.3d at 1317)); Ryan v. 
Hatfield, 578 F.2d 275, 277 (10th Cir. 1978) (“A situation in which attorney’s fees are 
permissible is where the opponent in litigation has acted ‘in bad faith . . . .’ ” 
(citations omitted) (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)). The court also 
referenced its earlier opinions. “We have held that this is beyond the district court’s 
inherent powers in federal litigation.” Morganroth, 213 F.3d at 1317 (citations 
omitted). Although the court was sitting in diversity, it refrained from ruling 
whether the bad faith exception actually ruled: “We have already noted that this 
award could not be sustained under Towerridge, if federal law governed. 
Because . . . we conclude that Utah law does not authorize the award of fees in this 
case either, we need not decide which law applies.” Id.  
137 Morganroth, 213 F.3d at 1318. 
138 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
139 See id. 
140 782 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1986). 
141 Id. at 345. Due to the case’s complicated fact pattern, this author just uses 
the case’s rule of law. See id. at 332–33. 
142 Id. at 345 (emphasis added); see Crum & Forster Ins. Co. v. Goodmark 
Indus., No. 05-CV-3633, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54757, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 
2008) (denying attorney fees because the moving party did “not allege that the 
Defendants committed misconduct or acted in bad faith in relation to the present 
civil action before this Court”). In truth, there is an unrecognized split within the 
Second Circuit regarding what conduct warrants the bad faith exception. This 
author was a victim of the false sense of universality that Dow Chemicals took for 
granted. Dow Chem., 782 F.2d at 345. After doing extensive research as part of a 
judicial internship, the author wrote a memo advocating fee-shifting for the 
insurance company of this Note’s theoretical case due to the business owner’s 
exceptional prelitigation bad faith. See supra text accompanying notes 5–6. In the 
meantime, United States District Court Judge Spatt issued an opinion denying the 
attorney fee motion—and making the author’s memo moot—basing his holding on a 
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IV.  THE BAD FAITH EXCEPTION: HOW BROAD SHOULD IT BE? 
A.  Response to the Circuits That Limit the Bad Faith Exception 
Circuit courts limiting the bad faith exception’s timeline 
have found that applying the exception to prelitigation conduct 
overemphasizes the Supreme Court’s dictum and contradicts the 
policies behind the American rule and the view of most federal 
courts.143  These reasons, however, can be addressed and 
neutralized, thereby leaving no excuse for courts to refrain from 
extending the bad faith exception to all conduct, including both 
prelitigation time periods. 
First, the Sixth Circuit in Shimman highlighted that Hall’s 
language, which seemingly extended the bad faith exception to 
prelitigation conduct, was dictum144 and as such should be 
discounted.  The Hall Court used a quote from Moore’s Federal 
Practice to support its version of the bad faith exception.145  As 
evidence that Moore’s only intended the exception to be applied to 
litigation conduct, the Shimman Court highlighted the passage 
in Moore’s immediately preceding what Hall quoted—“where an 
unfounded action or defense is brought or maintained.”146   
The Shimman reasoning discounts the fact that Supreme 
Court dictum is still important.147  Moreover, Hall quoted Moore’s 
for a list of the types of conduct that qualify for the exception and 
purposely omitted the text that set forth the time periods that 
 
different line of Second Circuit cases. See Crum, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54757, at 
*8–10. As both lines of cases ignored the fact that there was a dispute, disturbingly, 
both the Crum opinion and this author’s memo could present their individual 
version of the Second Circuit’s holding as universal.   
143 Some of these circuits have limited the exception to litigation, while others 
also apply the bad faith exception to the middle timeline—when a party refuses to 
recognize its opponent legal right. See supra Part III.C–D. All circuits whose 
reasoning is discussed in that Part have refused to apply the bad faith exception to 
the act that gave rise to the claim. See supra Part III.C–D. 
144 See Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226, 
1232 (6th Cir. 1984). 
145 See id. at 1233. 
146 Id. (“Moore’s Federal Practice precedes the quoted words with the statement, 
‘where an unfounded action or defense is brought or maintained. . . .’ It thus is clear 
that Hall did not extend the bad faith exception.” (quoting 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET 
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1709 (2d ed. 1972) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
147 This is especially true when the court goes out of its way to set forth the 
elements of a common-law rule. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1973). 
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qualify for the exception.148  At the very least, the actual Supreme 
Court opinion149 should carry more weight than the words of a 
treatise that it omitted.   
Second, the Shimman Court held that applying the bad faith 
exception to prelitigation conduct defeats the American rule’s 
rationale that parties bear their own fees.150  Similarly, in 
Morganroth, the Tenth Circuit held that a “defendant found 
liable for fraud, for instance, would automatically be guilty of bad 
faith with respect to the underlying cause of action,” and “[s]uch 
complete abrogation is not the purpose of the bad faith 
exception.”151  The general purpose behind the American rule—as 
the Supreme Court highlighted—is to encourage parties to 
“vindicate their rights.”152  This, however, does not apply to a 
party that acts in extreme bad faith because such actions go 
beyond “merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit.”153  Since the 
rule’s rationale is inapplicable to a party that acts in bad faith—
even if such actions occur before the litigation—so too should the 
American rule itself be inapplicable in such situations.  
Accordingly, all bad faith conduct should warrant the bad faith 
exception. 
Moreover, there are important safeguards rooted in the bad 
faith exception to assure the exception does not completely 
abrogate the American rule.  First, the conduct’s character must 
amount to extreme bad faith.154  Second, the award must serve 
the purposes of justice.155  Most importantly, the Tenth Circuit’s 
 
148 See id. at 5. 
149 Id. at 15 (“It is clear, however, that ‘bad faith’ may be found, not only in the 
actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.”).   
150 See Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1231. 
151 Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, 213 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
152 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) 
(“Since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely 
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit . . . .”). 
153 Id.; see also Morganroth, 213 F.3d at 1318 (finding the American rule does 
not apply in fraud cases).  
154 See Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987); Beaudry Motor Co. 
v. ABKO Props., Inc., 780 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1986); Cubita et al., supra note 1, 
at 284 (“Indeed, fee shifting under the ‘bad faith’ doctrine is justified only in 
exceptional circumstances.”). 
155 See Lipsig v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(“[T]he fee- shifting sanction is invocable only for some dominating reason of 
justice.”); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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reasoning is circular: If fee-shifting in all fraud cases is in line 
with the policies behind both the American rule and its bad faith 
exception, why is “[s]uch complete abrogation . . . not the purpose 
of the bad faith exception?”156 
Third, in Flight Attendants, the Ninth Circuit, uncomfortable 
with disregarding the Hall dictum, applied the exception to the 
middle timeline but not to the conduct that gave rise to the 
substantive claim.157  Although this holding technically “fits in” 
with the Hall dictum, it overlooks the fact that Hall did not make 
any distinctions within the prelitigation time periods.158  
Moreover, since the policies behind the American rule do not give 
sufficient cause to apply the rule to any prelitigation bad faith 
conduct,159 it is incumbent upon the courts to apply the rule’s 
exception to all prelitigation conduct.   
Fourth, in Lamb, the Eighth Circuit limited the bad faith 
exception because the Supreme Court in Chambers awarded 
attorney fees only on the basis of defendant’s bad faith conduct 
during the litigation and not for his intentional breach of 
contract.160  This reasoning incorrectly focuses only on the district 
court’s reasoning for its award.  The Supreme Court, however, 
was only affirming the award, not granting it.161  The Court was 
merely abiding by the district court’s holding and reasoning and 
actually noted that the award would also be proper under Rule 
11’s sanction power.162   
Moreover, as support for its limited bad faith exception 
timeline, the Lamb Court reasoned that a wrong on the court—
litigation bad faith—is significantly worse than a wrong on an 
 
156 Morganroth, 213 F.3d at 1318 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
157 See Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Horizon Air Indus., 976 F.2d 541, 550 (9th 
Cir. 1992).   
158 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). Neither did Chambers, Vaughan, or 
any other leading Supreme Court opinions that ruled on the bad faith exception. See 
generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 
U.S. 527 (1962). 
159 See infra Part IV.B–C. 
160 See Lamb Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 103 F.3d 1422, 1437 
(8th Cir. 1997). 
161 See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 35. 
162 See id. at 50. Rule 11 provides that by presenting a pleading to the court, an 
attorney represents—amongst other things—that the litigation “is not being 
presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). 
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individual—prelitigation bad faith.163  That one conduct is worse, 
however, does not prevent both types of conduct from being 
sufficient to warrant the bad faith exception.  Chambers, 
therefore, does not translate into excluding prelitigation conduct 
from the bad faith exception.  In fact, the Court went out of its 
way to explain that its holding in no way ruled on whether the 
bad faith exception applies to prelitigation conduct.164  
Fifth, the Tenth Circuit, in Morganroth, limited the bad faith 
exception to litigation conduct because it considered such the 
holding of the majority of federal courts.  This assertion is 
tenuous at best165 and contradicts language of the Supreme Court 
at worst.166  Moreover, merely counting the number of courts on 
each side of the split, without examining the underlying 
rationales and policies, is unwarranted. 
Although courts have proposed different reasons for limiting 
the bad faith exception, none of these reasons—with the possible 
exception of policy—withstand scrutiny.  Therefore, if it can be 
shown that expanding the bad faith exception to all prelitigation 
conduct is in line with the policies behind both the American rule 
and its bad faith exception, the remaining reasons offered by the 
courts for limiting the bad faith exception will be quashed. 
B. Circumventing the Policies Behind the American Rule 
The underlying policy behind the American rule is the desire 
not to deter parties from going to court.  The rule does not want 
to deter parties that have a potential legal right.167  Nevertheless, 
 
163 See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. 
164 Id. at 55 n.16 (“We . . . express no opinion as to whether the District Court 
would have had the inherent power to sanction Chambers for conduct relating to the 
underlying breach of contract . . . .”). Incredibly, the Lamb Court interpreted 
Chambers as limiting the bad faith exception to litigation conduct when the 
Chambers Court explicitly avoided ruling on that issue. See Lamb, 103 F.3d at 1437. 
165 See supra Part III.B–D. Depending on how the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth 
Circuit cases are interpreted, there are between three and five circuits that extend 
the exception to prelitigation conduct, while there are three circuits that limit the 
exception to litigation. See supra Part III.B–D. Even if the Morganroth court did not 
include these other circuits in its analysis, there is still no clear majority that 
instructs the court to limit the exception.  
166 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (“It is clear, however, that ‘bad faith’ 
may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct 
of the litigation.”). 
167 Such parties should not be required to pay both parties’ attorney fees should 
their claim not be successful, because the threat of such sanctions may prevent them 
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deterring a bad faith party from bringing or defending court 
actions is not a goal of this policy. 
Public policy, therefore, dictates that the exception should 
apply whether the bad faith was: (1) in the conduct underlying 
the claim; (2) in the obstinacy of a party refusing to recognize its 
opponent’s clear legal right; or (3) in the litigation itself.168   
In support of the American rule, it has been argued that since 
litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for 
merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor 
might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to 
vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees 
of their opponents’ counsel.  Also, the time, expense, and 
difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what 
constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees would pose substantial 
burdens for judicial administration.169 
These policies—not deterring parties from “vindicat[ing] their 
rights”170 and not burdening the judiciary to determine what 
“constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees”171—should be used to 
determine whether the American rule or its bad faith exception 
applies.   
The bad faith exception, therefore, should encompass all 
timelines172 because a bad faith party is not an intended 
beneficiary of the rule’s protection.173  The bad faith party is not 
“merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit”;174 rather the party is 
attempting to evade its obligation to compensate its opponent for 
its bad faith conduct.  Applying the exception as such will not 
discourage the “poor” from vindicating their rights.  Instead, 
they—and all parties—will only be discouraged from pursuing 
 
“from instituting actions to vindicate their rights.” Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. 
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). 
168 For a clearer delineation of the possible timelines, see supra Part II.C. 
169 Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 This includes bad faith in the conducting underlying the claim.  
173 But see Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226, 
1232 (6th Cir. 1984) (“The rationale behind the American rule remains intact when 
there is bad faith in the event underlying the substantive claim. A person who 
harms another in bad faith is nonetheless entitled to defend a lawsuit in good 
faith.”). 
174 Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 717. 
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litigation when they are undisputedly in the wrong and are 
nevertheless pursuing the claim for bad faith purposes.175 
Similarly, the concern of overburdening judicial 
administration does not favor limiting the bad faith exception to 
litigation conduct.  This is especially true in circuits that have 
developed an efficient test to guide their courts in determining 
the reasonableness of attorney fee awards.  For example, the 
Second Circuit has articulated a six-factor test for its courts to 
use when they order fee-shifting.176  To ensure reasonableness, 
the Second Circuit has also required that the award be “cross-
check[ed]” with the two available tests that evaluate the 
reasonableness of an attorney fee award.177  Such a structured 
setting requires minimal judicial administration to ensure the 
reasonableness of an attorney award.   
Moreover, a universal, all-encompassing bad faith exception 
will serve as deterrence against frivolous claims.  Although 
empirical data is unavailable, logically, fewer claims will be filed 
and more claims will be settled if parties are on notice that their 
bad faith conduct will be punished.178  Therefore, while extending 
the bad faith exception to prelitigation conduct will likely 
increase motions for attorney fees and the judicial resources 
 
175 An example of a bad faith purpose would be when the party intends to harass 
its opponent. Every true dispute, however, will not be subject to the bad faith 
exception or its fee-shifting penalty. 
176 In Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000), the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set forth six factors for its courts to consider 
when determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded. These factors are: 
“ ‘(1) the time and labor expended by counsel; (2) the magnitude and complexities of 
the litigation; (3) the risk of the litigation . . . ; (4) the quality of representation; 
(5) the requested fee in relation to the settlement; and (6) public policy 
considerations.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec. 
Regulation, 724 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
177 See id. In the Second Circuit, attorney fee awards are calculated by using 
either the “lodestar”—based on hours expended—or the “percentage of the fund”—
contingency—method when determining the amount of the award. Id. Essentially, 
all courts utilize both methods, as whichever method a court does not use is still 
used to cross-check the award’s reasonableness. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa 
U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 123 (2d Cir. 2005) (“As a ‘cross-check’ to a percentage 
award, courts in this Circuit use the lodestar method.”) (quoting Goldberger, 209 
F.3d at 50); Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 50 (“[T]he lodestar remains useful as a baseline 
even if the percentage method is eventually chosen.”).  
178 See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The 
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1612 (1993) (“In England, 
approximately ninety-nine percent of all claims for damages are settled before 
trial.”).  
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needed to determine the reasonableness of such fees, the courts’ 
ability to avoid entire cases179 will outweigh this additional use of 
resources.  The judicial resources needed to rule on an attorney-
fee motion involving a case with which the judge is familiar with 
are substantially less than the judicial resources needed to 
adjudicate a new case.180  
C. Promoting the Policies Behind the Bad Faith Exception  
Interpreting the bad faith exception to apply to all three time 
periods also promotes the policies behind the exception.  
“Generally, the policies upheld through the award of costs and 
attorney’s fees include: punishment of the losing party, 
indemnification of the prevailing party, and the deterrence of 
frivolous and bad faith litigation.”181  A party acting in bad faith 
before the litigation should not be allowed to escape a fee-shifting 
punishment merely because his bad faith conduct occurred before 
the litigation; his conduct is just as culpable.  Similarly, the party 
injured by the bad faith conduct deserves to be indemnified 
regardless of the timing of the bad faith.  The injured party 
should not be responsible for legal costs that were only necessary 
due to his opponent’s bad faith, regardless of when the bad faith 
occurred.182  Thus, any type of bad faith conduct, even 
prelitigation conduct, should be discouraged.  It can be said, 
therefore, that applying the bad faith exception to all 
prelitigation bad faith conduct is directly in line with public 
policy.  As stated by the Second Circuit:  “Assessment of counsel 
fees under [bad faith] circumstances in no way conflicts with the 
primary justification for the rule against the shifting of counsel 
 
179 This will occur because bad faith parties will properly be deterred from 
bringing bad faith litigation. 
180 As a new case would involve new law, arguments, facts, procedures, and 
possibly jury selection, it is more efficient for a judge who is familiar with the case to 
rule on the motion. This author assumes that the Fleischmann Court’s efficient 
judicial administration policy was only in the context of adding more motions 
without a simultaneous decrease in claim filings. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. 
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). Otherwise, the argument presented 
here seems to refute the Court’s policy. Such an assumption, however, is 
counterintuitive, as there will likely be an inverse relationship between the breadth 
of the bad faith exception and the number of claims filed. 
181 Lord, supra note 7, at 86. For additional sources that explain the policies of 
the bad faith exception, see articles cited supra note 29. 
182 See Gotanda, supra note 29; Greene, supra note 29; Cubita, supra note 1. 
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fees, namely, that the defendant should not be discouraged from 
fairly contesting the plaintiff’s claims.”183 
The Supreme Court intended for the bad faith exception to 
act as a punitive measure.184  A uniform standard for the timeline 
of the exception will best effectuate the Court’s objective.185  
Conversely, any inconsistency within the federal courts will 
weaken a law’s intended deterrence, as a party will not be fully 
cognizant of the law and its effects or might think that it can 
evade the law’s penalties.186  This is especially true for intra-
circuit splits, which create more upheaval regarding the state of 
the law.187  
D. The Bottom Line 
The circuit courts’ rulings reflect the confusion regarding the 
bad faith exception to the American rule for attorney fees.188  
Although such confusion is a natural progression of the 
discretionary nature of the exception, a district court’s discretion 
should be limited to examining the specific facts of a case and 
determining whether the exception applies to such conduct.189  
The court, however, should not have discretion to choose which 
time period it examines when making its determination.190   
 
183 Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973). This 
Second Circuit case was decided immediately before the Supreme Court’s Hall v. 
Cole decision. See id. at 1281 (decided May 9, 1973); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 1 (1973) 
(decided May 21, 1973). 
184 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 53 (1991); Hall, 412 U.S. at 5. 
185 See Chipser, supra note 1, at 331.  
The exception is used only as a remedy for abuse and unnecessary . . . delay 
caused by bad faith and obstinacy. Instances of abuse of the exception will 
be rare, and its misapplication can be reduced to a minimum if judges and 
litigants make sure the developed standards are carefully applied. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
186 A party might assume that its case will be decided in accordance with those 
courts that interpret the bad faith exception in a narrow sense. 
187 See, e.g., supra notes 113–20, 140–42 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Second Circuit’s split regarding the bad faith exception’s timeline). 
188 There is a fractionalized debate as to when the bad faith conduct must occur 
to warrant the exception.   
189 In other words, the court must use its discretion to determine whether the 
facts of the case before it are sufficient to warrant the bad faith exception and its fee-
shifting consequence. 
190 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9 n.13 (1973) (“Although this consideration is 
undoubtedly an important one, it is relevant, not to the power of federal courts to 
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V. PROPOSAL 
A. Uniform Timeline 
All federal courts should broaden the bad faith exception to 
include all time periods—beginning with the conduct that is 
underlying the claim and ending with the conclusion of the 
litigation.  This is consistent with the simple reading in Hall v. 
Cole, where the Court—without any request to rule on the 
matter—stated: “It is clear, however, that ‘bad faith’ may be 
found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in 
the conduct of the litigation.”191  Even the courts that interpret 
Hall narrowly192 still agree that Hall recommends the bad faith 
exception be applied to the middle timeline.193   
If Hall is read narrowly and only extends the bad faith 
exception to the middle timeline,194 the exception’s policies would 
be promoted nearly as efficiently as if this Note’s proposal—that 
all prelitigation conduct should be subject to the exception—were 
followed.  Typically, when conduct underlying the claim is made 
in bad faith, the injured party is before the court because its 
opponent is obstinately refusing to recognize its clear legal right.  
For example, in this Note’s theoretical case involving the 
intentional arson and subsequent fraudulent insurance claim,195 
it is clear to the business owner, once he is convicted of insurance 
fraud, that the insurance company has a legal right to its 
payout.196  Therefore, even under the narrower interpretation of 
 
award counsel fees generally, but, rather, to the exercise of the District Court’s 
discretion on a case-by-case basis.” (emphasis added)). 
191 Id. at 15.  
192 See supra Part III.C. 
193 See supra Part III.C. This is when the losing party’s refusal to recognize the 
prevailing party’s clear legal right forced the prevailing party to go to court to 
enforce its right. Although this interpretation of Hall can be squared with the 
Court’s language, it overlooks the policies behind the American rule and the bad 
faith exception. See supra Part IV.B–C. 
194 See supra Part III.C. “Only” distinguishes between the two distinct 
prelitigation categories, but the exception certainly also applies to litigation bad 
faith conduct.   
195 See supra text accompanying note 6.   
196 In other words, a party guilty of prelitigation bad faith conduct generally also 
forces its adversary to go to court to enforce its clear legal right. An important 
exception to this general rule occurs when the conduct underlying the claim was in 
bad faith, yet a true legal dispute remains—whether the bad faith party owes its 
opponent damages on account of its bad faith conduct. For example, consider a 
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Hall,197 prelitigation bad faith conduct typically leads to the same 
result: fee-shifting for the injured party. 
This Note does not advocate that a court’s decision to apply 
the exception should no longer be discretionary; rather it touts 
the benefits to the legal system should the scope of the court’s 
discretion include all bad faith conduct.  Not all prelitigation bad 
faith conduct or, for that matter, litigation bad faith conduct198 
will necessarily be subject to the bad faith exception.  For 
example, if a jury finds that the defendant intentionally 
defrauded the plaintiff, the bad faith exception automatically 
warranted?199  What if the defendant still maintains his 
innocence and the plaintiff’s star witness lied because of a 
vendetta?  Such situations are addressed by the judge, the 
arbiter of the exception’s applicability, and not the jury.  Not only 
does the judge decide whether to apply the exception, but the 
exception’s very nature is discretionary.200  The exception is only 
to be applied when the conduct is of extreme bad faith and the 
fee-shifting serves the interests of justice.201  Therefore, should 
 
partner in a law firm who cheated his partners out of $2 million during the “winding 
up”—the period after the dissolution but before all the accounts are settled—of the 
partnership. The bad faith partner then declared bankruptcy. The remaining legal 
question is whether the bad faith partner had a fiduciary duty to his fellow partners 
during the winding up of the partnership. The claims against the partner cannot be 
discharged in bankruptcy if he had a fiduciary duty at the point he committed the 
fraud. This is similar to the facts of Shiboleth v. Yerushalmi (In re Yerushalmi), 393 
B.R. 288, 292, 295 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008).  
Assuming the claims against the partner are found to be nondischargeable, the 
judge must make a fine distinction in applying the bad faith exception. If the judge 
determines that bad faith conduct underlying the action warrants the bad faith 
exception, he can award attorney fees for the injured partners. If, however, the judge 
determines that the exception is only warranted for the middle timeline, attorney 
fees should not be awarded here as the bad faith partner did not deny his opponents 
their clear legal right; the legal rights of his partners were unclear and litigation 
was necessary to clarify them. 
197 See supra text accompanying notes 107–11. 
198 As this Note proposes that all prelitigation conduct be subject to the bad faith 
exception, the analysis focuses on all three time periods. 
199 See Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, 213 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir. 
2000) (“[A] defendant found liable for fraud, for instance, would automatically be 
guilty of bad faith with respect to the underlying cause of action, thus abrogating the 
American rule in all successful fraud actions.”); supra text accompanying notes 138, 
150–56.  
200 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9 n.13 (1973). 
201 See Beaudry Motor Co. v. ABKO Props., Inc., 780 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 
1986). An example of when an attorney award for extreme bad faith conduct would 
not serve the interests of justice is when the prevailing party has also been guilty of 
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the judge determine that the defendant’s guilt is questionable, 
the judge can refuse to apply the bad faith exception.   
B. Procedural Effects of the Proposal 
The proposal has important procedural implication.  Despite 
jury charges to the contrary, juries often factor an attorney fee 
into the award amount.202  Therefore, juries should be informed 
before they reach a verdict of the possibility that the prevailing 
party’s attorney fees may be paid by the party’s opponent.203  
C. Predictability as Deterrence 
If this proposal were to be adopted by all the circuits, 
litigants would be more certain as to the exception’s timeline, 
which would induce: (1) less litigation regarding the applicability 
of the bad faith exception; (2) less obstinacy by bad faith parties; 
and (3) perhaps even less bad faith conduct due to the possible 
punitive punishment.  Certainty, consistency, and clarity are 
important priorities of the judicial system.  Moreover, once a 
party is clearly put on notice as to which bad faith conduct will be 
punished with fee-shifting, the exception will serve as a more 
efficient disincentive.  Such notice will deter illegitimate behavior 
inside and outside of the courtroom, an important purpose of the 
 
misconduct. See, e.g., In re Kaid, 347 F. Supp. 540, 543–44 (E.D. Va. 1972); Lee Nat’l 
Corp. v. Kan. City S. Indus., 50 F.R.D. 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
202 See Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 14 & n.31 (“[I]t is quite likely that juries 
[take] legal expenses into consideration when they asses[ ] damages . . . .”). 
203 This is still troubling as the jury will not know the judge’s ruling on the 
motion for attorney fees when it decides its verdict. Therefore, it is a financial risk 
for a party to make a motion for attorney fees: Even if an attorney calculates that 
there is a 50% chance the judge will grant the motion—and therefore the award—if 
the attorney also calculates a 60% chance that the jury will minimize its award due 
to his motion, the motion has a negative expectation value (50% X < 60% X). This is 
even worse than a pure chance game. The jury will assume that the attorney will 
receive the typical one-third contingency fee and will increase its award accordingly; 
a reasonable attorney fee award, however, is often less than that. See, e.g., 
Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding 25% to be 
a typical attorney fee award). Therefore, even if the judge orders fee-shifting, 
requesting such fees may be a net loss for the moving party. This scenario is more a 
fundamental problem with juries improperly factoring the attorney fees into their 
awards than it is a defect in the bad faith exception.   
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exception.204  Finally, this clear notice will also help prevent 
“harm done to the court itself,”205 an underlying tenet of the bad 
faith exception.  
CONCLUSION 
The current bad faith exception is applied chaotically by 
federal courts.  While all courts agree that bad faith conduct 
during the litigation is subject to the exception, they are divided 
over whether the prelitigation time periods are also within the 
exception’s scope.  Some circuits have ignored the Supreme 
Court’s language altogether.  Others have overlooked the policies 
behind both the American rule and its bad faith exception.206  To 
remedy the chaos, the exception should be applied to all bad faith 
conduct—including both prelitigation time periods.  Applying the 
exception in this manner does not contradict the policies of the 
American rule because the party acting in bad faith is not being 
punished for bringing an action; it is being punished for bringing 
the action in bad faith.  Moreover, applying the exception to all 
bad faith conduct will deter such conduct, serve the interests of 
justice by indemnifying the prevailing party, and punish the bad 
faith actor. 
 
 
204 See Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 29 (“The ‘bad faith’ doctrine . . . awards 
attorney fees against parties who litigate in bad faith, for the obvious purpose of 
deterring illegitimate behavior in the courtroom, and sometimes outside it.”). 
205 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 n.17 (1991) (explaining that the 
shareholder’s “fraudulent transfer of assets [that] took place before the suit was 
filed,” but after he was “given notice . . . of the pending suit” perpetrated a “harm 
done to the court itself”). Such harm likely refers to the wasted judicial resources 
required to adjudicate bad faith actions. See id.; Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944) (“[T]ampering with the administration of 
justice . . . is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the 
public . . . .”); supra text accompanying notes 177–80. 
206 Adding to the chaos, the Second Circuit has an internal split regarding the 
exception’s timeline. See supra note 142. 
